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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
intimately what that witness is going to say?"" 2 Thus, the court reasoned
that the claimant could not properly prepare for trial without examin-
ing the consultant engineer. And, the court added that compliance with
section 17 of the Court of Claims Act automatically satisfied the "special
circumstances" requirement of CPLR 3101 (a) (4). Accordingly, the state
was ordered to produce the engineer for examination.
ARTICLE 32- ACCELERATED JuDcEN
Collateral Estoppel: Prior judgment establishing freedom from negli-
gence does not ipso facto establish freedom from contributory negli-
gence in second action.
In Schwartz v. Public Administrator"3 the Court of Appeals ruled
that there remained only two prerequisites to the invocation of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel: "an identity of issue which has neces-
sarily been decided in the prior action . . . and . . . a full and fair
opportunity to contest the [prior] decision."1 4 In Schwartz, the de-
fendant, driver D-1, moved to dismiss a personal injuries action
brought against him by the plaintiff, driver D-2, on the ground that
a prior adjudication of negligence on the part of driver D-2 barred
recovery. In a prior action, passengers in the Schwartz car brought a
successful personal injuries action against both drivers D-1 and D-2 as
codefendants." 3' As a result, the defendant D-1 was able to persuade
the Court that the prior determination of negligence estopped plaintiff
D-2 from demonstrating his freedom from contributory negligence, a
necessary element of his prima facie case, in the second action.
Recently, in Nesbitt v. Nimmich,116 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, refused to extend the Schwartz rationale to a slightly
varied situation. Plaintiff, driver D-1, moved for summary judgment
in a personal injury action against defendant, driver D-2, on the basis
of a prior action against both drivers. In contrast to the facts in
Schwartz, the jury had returned a verdict against the present defendant
alone, acquitting the present plaintiff of negligence vis-hL-vis the original
plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff argued that by implication the jury had exon-
erated him on the issue of contributory negligence. The appellate
division disagreed, reasoning that "it does not necessarily follow that
112 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 22, at 27 (1970).
113 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); see generally Rosenberg,
Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165 (1969); The Quarterly Survey,
44 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 135, 144-51 (1969).
114 24 N.Y.2d at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
115 80 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1968).
116 34 App. Div. 2d 958, 312 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970).
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the plaintiff... can prove he was free from contributory negligence
merely because the passenger who sued him in the first action was
unable to establish his negligence by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence." 1' Thus, although plaintiff might be entitled to partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of defendant's negligence,1 8 he would
have the burden of proving his own freedom from contributory negli-
gence, and if the evidence were evenly balanced, defendant would be
entitled to judgment in his favor.
CPLR 3213: Surety's labor and material bond deemed not to consti-
tute an instrument for the payment of money only.
Although CPLR 3213 has already been the subject of three amend-
ments, it is not yet clear what is encompassed by the phrase "instrument
for the payment of money only." 1 9 At least, that is the overall impres-
sion yielded by an examination of the cases arising under this section. 20
That a negotiable instrument qualifies as a presumptively meritorious
claim is certain.121 But, beyond this it is difficult to predict whether a
particular instrument will meet the court's definition of a money-only
instrument. Perhaps the most well-received criterion advanced thus far
is that an instrument is susceptible to 3213 treatment if a prima facie
case is established by proof of the instrument and a failure to make the
payments prescribed thereunder. 22
In Kipp Brothers, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.123
the Supreme Court, Westchester County, ruled that a labor and ma-
terial bond executed by defendant as surety is not the type of instru-
ment envisioned by the draftsmen of CPLR 3213. The court reasoned
that although plaintiff had a direct action against the surety, the latter's
obligation was secondary to the principal's duty of performance and
only arises when the principal breaches its obligation. Since proof of
facts extraneous to the bond would thus be necessary to establish a
117Id. at 959, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
118 CPLR 3212 (e); cf. De Paul v. George, 34 App. Div. 2d 620, 309 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Ist
Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 342, 358 (1970).
119 The construction problems arising under CPLR 3213 are due in part to the fact
that similar relief did not exist under the CPA. In addition, the legislative reports on the
section are silent as to what instruments the section was intended to encompass. See FiRsT
REr. 91; FIFrH REP. 492; SIXTH REP. 338.
120 For a discussion of cases arising under this section, see H. PETE-,REUND & J. Mc-
LAUGHLN, NEw YoRK PRArICE 860 (2d ed. 1968); The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv., 359, 160 (1970); The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 335 (1969).
121 Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d
752 (Ist Dep't 1968).
122 Id.
123 63 Misc. 2d 788, 314 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970).
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